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Atieno Mboya

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE REGIME
ABSTRACT
This article discusses human rights implications of the marketbased mechanisms operationalized under the global climate
change regime. It examines greenhouse gas emissions rights
created by the Kyoto Protocol and continued by the Paris
Agreement. This article discusses implications of these rights for
the protection and realization of human rights in the wake of
climate change and argues that greenhouse gas emissions rights,
as currently constituted, are incompatible with human rights
protections. While the Paris Agreement’s recognition of human
rights is a significant development, the protection and realization
of human rights by states under a free-market approach to
climate change remains a challenge. This article calls for
allocation of carbon investment rights for developing countries
as a means of promoting the climate justice platform identified by
human rights proponents, and reducing the economic gulf
between developed and developing countries.
INTRODUCTION
Climate change is the most pressing environmental issue of the 21st
century. The problem has arisen from exploitation of Earth’s carbon-based
resources such as oil, coal and natural gas, which produce more than two-thirds of
the global greenhouse gas emissions that are fueling climate change.2 These gases
accumulate in the stratosphere and re-radiate heat rising from Earth back to the
planet, causing an enhanced greenhouse effect, also known as global warming. This
warming is precipitating more frequent extreme and unpredictable weather events,
1
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1. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 6 (5th ed.
2015).
2. See Press Release, Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, UNFCC Exec. Sec’y: Worst Effects of Climate Change Can Be Staved Off if Appropriate
International Action to Mitigate Is Speedily Taken 1 (May 4, 2007), https://unfccc.int/files/press/news_r
oom/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/20070503_ipcc_wgiii_press_release_berlin.pdf.
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such as typhoons, floods, droughts, heat waves, wild fires, ice melts and rising sea
levels.3 Earth’s climate is changing.
Climate change is bringing new socio-economic vulnerabilities into
human lives and livelihoods, which are being felt in agricultural production, human
health, access to potable water and threats to habitats of coastal communities, to
name a few.4 In the agricultural arena, for example, unpredictable rainfall patterns
are destabilizing planting and harvesting seasons.5 In human health, the spread of
deadly diseases like malaria and dengue fever into new areas is an emerging
threat.6 Floods and droughts are restricting communities’ access to sufficient,
reliable potable water. Rising sea levels especially imperil coastal and island
communities, threatening to engulf homes and, in cases like Tuvalu’s,7 entire island
states, portending a climate refugee crisis. It is now understood that intensive
carbon-based industrialization is unsustainable.8
Rajendra Pachauri, chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) during the preparation of its Fifth Assessment Report, notes that
while all societies stand to suffer some negative impacts of climate change, “there
is an equity issue, because some of the poorest communities in the poorest
countries in the world are going to be the worst hit.”9 Inequality in the fallout from
climate change, coupled with inequality in access to resources to adapt to the new
normal or mitigate it, raises issues of justice for “the world’s poor and

3. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issues periodic Assessment Reports
that provide scientific evidence supporting the existence of anthropogenic climate change. The latest
report is the Fifth Assessment Report, issued beginning in 2013. Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), IPCC,
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) (The report is divided into three Working
Group Contributions and one Synthesis Report, each of which is available from the source cited.).
4. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 631–32 (3rd
ed. 2007).
5. See, e.g., Sonja Vermeulen et al., Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security: A Global
Partnership to Link Research and Action for Low-Income Agricultural Producers and Consumers, 4
CURRENT OPINION ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 128 (2012) (discussing efforts by the Research Program on
Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) to strategically direct research in order to
more effectively address climate change mitigation and adaptation); John Recha et al., Coping with
Unpredictable Rainfall Patterns in Nyando, RES. PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE, AGRIC. & FOOD
SECURITY (Jan. 16, 2017), https://ccafs.cgiar.org/blog/coping-unpredictable-rainfall-patternsnyando#.WmUIxKinFPZ.
6. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN
HEALTH: RISKS AND RESPONSES 79–155 (A.J. McMichael et al. eds., 2003), http://www.who.int/globalc
hange/publications/climchange.pdf?ua=1 (discussing the relationship between climate change and
infectious disease).
7. See generally HOLLEY RALSTON ET AL., GERMANWATCH, CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGES
TUVALU (2004), https://germanwatch.org/download/klak/fb-tuv-e.pdf.
8. In 2013, the Guardian reported that the IPCC had revised its September report to reflect an
estimate of 555 billion tonnes of carbon emitted since 1750, noting that the report also showed global
emissions at the time running at approximately 10 billion tonnes a year. See IPCC Revises Carbon
Emission Figures in Recent UN Climate Report, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2013), [http://sustai
nabilityoutlook.in/news/ipcc-revises-carbon-emission-figures-recent-un-climate-report-86028].
9. Matt McGrath, Climate Inaction Catastrophic - US, BBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.b
bc.com/news/science-environment-26824943 (quoting IPCC chair Rajendra Pachauri).
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marginalized,”10 which are captured in a growing civil society platform for climate
justice. The 2007 Malé Declaration notes that climate change “has clear and
immediate implications for the full enjoyment of human rights, including, inter
alia, the right to life, the right to take part in cultural life, the right to use and enjoy
property, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to food, and the right
to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”11
The international community’s response, as exemplified in the 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its
1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement, has been primarily marketbased. Markets, however, are concerned with profit-generation, not social justice.
This paper will discuss human rights implications of the global market-based
approaches to climate change. The neoliberal foundations of those approaches are a
cause of concern, given the link between neoliberalism and growing global
inequality.12 Neoliberalism calls for free markets and deregulation, opening
domestic markets to foreign competition, and privatizing state enterprises to reduce
the role of the state.13 This approach to climate change has negative implications
for human rights protections for constituencies that have limited economic
resources and yet face the worst impacts of climate change.
This paper examines human rights implications of the market-based
approaches to climate change and argues that greater attention to human rights will
promote a more equitable climate regime. Section 1 discusses the urgency of the
climate problem and the need for the duty bearers to respond to the claims of rights
holders. Section 2 traces the development of the climate regime. Section 3
examines the market-based responses and critiques the skewed nature of emissions
rights allocations that have left developing countries disadvantaged in the growing
carbon market. Section 4 discusses parallels and disparities between the carbon
market and the global currency market, underlining the imbalance between
developed and developing countries in the established currency market and the
burgeoning carbon market. The section also discusses human rights impacts of the
market-based approach to climate change. Section 5 concludes the analysis.
I. URGENCY OF THE CLIMATE PROBLEM
Scientists agree that climate change is occurring at a faster rate and with
greater impacts than previously projected.14 They warn that the goal of pegging

10. Larry Elliott & Ashley Seager, Cut Carbon by up to Third to Save Poor, UN Tells West,
GUARDIAN, (Nov. 28, 2007, 7:46 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/nov/28/climate
change (quoting Kevin Watkins, editor of the United Nations Development Programme’s 2007/2008
Human Development Report).
11. Malé Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change 1 (Nov. 14, 2007),
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Male_Declaration_Nov07.pdf.
12. See ALASTAIR GREIG ET AL., CHALLENGING GLOBAL INEQUALITY: DEVELOPMENT THEORY
AND PRACTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 4–7 (2007), for a discussion of inequality between individuals on
a global scale.
13. See Jonathan D. Ostry et al., Neoliberalism: Oversold?, FIN. & DEV., June 2016, at 38, 38, http:
//www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/pdf/ostry.pdf.
14. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 608; see also SPENCER WEART, RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE
(2017), https://history.aip.org/climate/pdf/Rapid.pdf; Is Current Warming Natural?, NASA: EARTH
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global warming to no more than two degrees Celsius above nineteenth century
levels is unlikely to be met,15 and warming beyond two degrees Celsius could
trigger a tipping point for rapid and uncontrollable climate hazards that could
precipitate multiple meters of sea level rise by 2100.16 Reining in climate change
requires removal of “carbon [from] the energy we use to run the economy.”17 In the
2015 Paris Agreement, states have committed to keep global warming to no more
than one and a half degrees Celsius to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
levels.18
Parties responsible for disrupting the global climate are the duty bearers
and those suffering negative climatic impacts are the rights holders. The duty
bearers are primarily the world’s industrialized (developed) nations who have
fueled their two and a half centuries of development by burning Earth’s carbonbased resources.19 The rights holders are the populations residing in both developed
and developing countries. Duty bearers have an obligation to reduce their emissions
in quantities and at rates that will prevent dangerous climate change. If climate
change reaches a tipping point before developing countries—who are still
struggling to industrialize and raise their standards of living—have made
significant strides in development, they are likely to remain trapped in poverty for a
long time. This is because scarce economic resources will be diverted into putting
out more frequent “climate fires”, rather than being used for development
activities.
The goal of the UNFCCC is to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gases at a
level that would “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.”20 The treaty calls for quantified emissions limitations reductions for
developed (industrialized) countries, which was operationalized through the Kyoto
Protocol to the UNFCCC (now replaced by the 2015 Paris Agreement). The
Protocol and the Paris Agreement contain procedures and substantive requirements
needed to achieve the aim of the UNFCCC. However, an unusual feature of the

OBSERVATORY, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/GlobalWarming/page4.php (last visited Jan.
22, 2018); Is the Current Climate Change Unusual Compared to Earlier Changes in Earth’s History?,
IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/faq-6-2.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018).
15. See, e.g., Patrick Lynch, Secrets from the Past Point to Rapid Climate Change in the Future,
NASA: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 14, 2011), https://climate.nasa.gov/news/649/secrets-fromthe-past-point-to-rapid-climate-change-in-the-future/.
16. Id.
17. PETER NEWELL & MATHEW PATERSON, CLIMATE CAPITALISM: GLOBAL WARMING AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (2010).
18. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, Dec.
12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
19. Cf. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CLIMATE CHANGE: MEETING THE
CHALLENGE TO 2050, at 7 (2008), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/21/39762914.pdf (“One of the
unique aspects of tackling climate change is the time lag between cause and effect. This generation
pollutes but the next generation will suffer the consequences. A similar imbalance occurs geographically
– the regions and countries worst-hit by the effects of climate change are expected to be those where
emissions are lowest.”).
20. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, opened for signature June 4,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
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Paris Agreement is that, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which was wholly legally
binding, the former has both binding and non-binding aspects. 21
The Preamble to the Paris Agreement acknowledges that climate change is
a common concern of humankind and calls on the parties to “respect, promote and
consider their respective obligations on human rights” when responding to climate
change.22 This is significant as it is the first time that a multilateral environmental
agreement has explicitly referenced human rights, underlining the urgency of the
need to mitigate climate change.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE CLIMATE REGIME
The climate regime was launched in 1979 when the World Meteorological
Organization convened the First World Climate Conference.23 Almost a decade
later in 1988, the first session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) was held.24 In 1990, the Second World Climate Conference recommended
that states adopt a framework climate change convention25 that would establish
broad commitments for members. Specific targets were to be set in more detailed
agreements; the first of these was the Kyoto Protocol, the most recent, the Paris
Agreement. That same year, the first session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change was held.26 Two years
later, the 1992 UNFCCC was adopted in New York; it entered into force in 1994.27
The UNFCCC established a general system of climate governance with few
substantive obligations for curbing climate change.28 In 1995, the IPCC released its
Second Assessment of climate change, which concluded that human activity was
changing Earth’s climate.29
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted, which set
binding targets for industrial states (listed in Annex 1 of the Protocol) to achieve a
five percent reduction in GHG emissions below 1990 levels over a five-year

21. See Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2
es.org/international/2015-agreement/paris-climate-talks-qa (last visited Oct. 3, 2017); cf. Robin
Andrews, The European Union Just Voted to Make the Paris Agreement Legally Binding, IFLSCIENCE
(June 15, 2017, 5:29 PM), http://www.iflscience.com/environment/european-union-voted-make-parisagreement-legally-binding/ (noting that “[o]ne of the major complaints . . . [about] the Paris agreement
is that there is no punishment of any form for countries that fail to meet their greenhouse gas (GHG)slashing targets” and discussing a European Parliament vote in favor of binding national emissions
targets).
22. Paris Agreement, supra note 19, pmbl.
23. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 666 tbl.11-9.
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. First Steps to a Safer Future: Introducing the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/
essential_background/convention/items/6036.php.
28. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 665.
29. Id. at 666 tbl.11-9.
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period.30 In 2000, the IPCC’s Third Assessment identified “discernible, man-made
effect[s] on the environment,”31 suggesting that emissions reductions were not
keeping up with the targets set under the Protocol. In 2001, the U.S. unilaterally
repudiated the Protocol32 while that same year, Europe, Japan and the other nations
agreed to the Marrakech Accords, which laid out enforcement rules on land use,
land-use change and forestry under the Protocol.33 In 2005, the Protocol entered
into force and the European Union (EU) launched its carbon trading platform, the
European Trading System (EU ETS).34 In 2007, the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment
showed that emissions levels were “almost double pre-industrial levels and rising
fast.”35 The First Reporting Period under the Protocol was set to run from 20082012.36
In 2009, the Conference of the Parties (COP), the primary policy-making
organ of the UNFCCC, held its fifteenth meeting in Copenhagen, where it was
hoped that higher emissions reduction targets (even as high as thirty per cent for
Annex 1 countries) would be set.37 No such agreement was reached, and it was
instead left for each country to decide how it would reduce its emissions, laying the
foundation for the approach that was to be taken six years later in Paris, which
requires that every state, industrial or non-industrial, adopt nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) of emissions reductions. 38 In Copenhagen, a non-binding
promise was made by developed countries to assist developing countries with
climate finance and for industrial states to move forward with international
monitoring of emissions.39
Ahead of the Copenhagen conference, eleven countries met near Malé in
the Maldives, “express[ing] alarm at the pace of [environmental] change” that was
taking place on the planet in the wake of climate change.40 This meeting marked
the formation of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, which has grown to forty-three

30. See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FACT SHEET: THE
KYOTO PROTOCOL 1 (2011), https://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/fact_sheet_the_
kyoto_protocol.pdf.
31. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 666 tbl.11-9.
32. See id.
33. See generally LULUCF - Developments at Past COP and SB Sessions, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/land_use_and_climate_change/luluc
f/items/3063.php (last visited September 15, 2017).
34. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 666 tbl.11-9.
35. Stephen Humphreys, Introduction: Human Rights and Climate Change, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 20 (Stephen Humphreys ed., 2009).
36. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 666 tbl.11-9.
37. See Appendix I - Quantified Economy-Wide Emission Targets for 2020, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009
/items/5264.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
38. Paris Agreement, supra note 18, art. 4.
39. See generally Copenhagen Climate Change Conference - December 2009, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/me
eting/6295.php (last visited July 21, 2017).
40. Brief History of the CVF, CLIMATE VULNERABLE F., http://www.thecvf.org/web/climatevulnerable-forum/brief-history-of-the-cvf/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
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countries.41 The sixteenth COP was held in Cancun, Mexico, in November 2010.
Three important outcomes of this meeting were the proposal of a technology
mechanism to boost innovation, the adoption of an Adaptation Framework and the
establishment of a Green Climate Fund to assist developing countries.42 This
proposal was a follow-up to the promise made by developed countries in
Copenhagen, which came to fruition with the convening of the first meeting of the
Board of the Green Climate Fund in 2012.43 In Cancun, countries were also urged
to take human rights into consideration when responding to climate change, and
this call would come to fruition with the inclusion of human rights in the preamble
of the Paris Agreement.
COP 17 was held in Durban, South Africa, in November and December,
2011, and member-states promised to have a new climate treaty (to succeed the
Kyoto Protocol) in place by 2015.44 The decision was also made in Durban to
operationalize the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which would help non-industrial
countries with adaptation and developing carbon-free technologies.45 On the human
rights front, activists in Durban called for the GCF to be de-linked from the
IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework, which they argued would only
exacerbate the crushing debt burdens that developing countries already bear.46
In 2012, COP 18 was held in Doha, Qatar. Here, participants discussed the
loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries,
which are especially vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.47 The goal
was to enhance their adaptive capacity.48 COP 19 was held in Warsaw, Poland, in
2013 where an international mechanism to address loss and damage was
established; a timeline for capitalization of the Green Climate Fund was set; an
agreement was reached on the rulebook for reducing emissions from deforestation;
41. CVF Participating Countries, CLIMATE VULNERABLE F., http://www.thecvf.org/web/climatevulnerable-forum/cvf-participating-countries/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
42. Cancun Climate Change Conference - November 2010, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/meeting/6266.php
(last visited July 21, 2017).
43. See Louise Helen Brown & Athena Ballesteros, What’s Next for the Green Climate Fund?,
WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Aug. 27. 2012), https://www.wri.org/blog/2012/08/whats-next-greenclimate-fund (describing the Green Climate Fund’s first meeting and examining issues for the Fund’s
board to address in the future).
44. See Durban Climate Change Conference - November/December 2011, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_2011/meeting/6245.php (last visited July 21, 2017).
45. John M. Broder, Climate Talks in Durban Yield Limited Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/science/earth/countries-at-un-conference-agree-to-draft-ne
w-emissions-treaty.html?_r=1&src=rechp.
46. See Press Release, Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Climate Finance Should Not
Add to the External Debt Burdens of Poor Recipient Countries, Says UN Expert (Dec. 8, 2011), http://ne
wsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11697&LangID=E (quoting
Cephas Lumina, at the time the United Nations Independent Expert on foreign debt and human rights).
47. DOREEN STABINSKY, COP 18 OUTCOME ON LOSS AND DAMAGE OPENS DOOR FOR NEW
MECHANISM 1 (TWN Doha News Update No. 26, 2012), http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/news/
doha01/TWN_update26.pdf.
48. Doha Climate Change Conference - November 2012, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/doha_nov_2012/
meeting/6815/php/view/decisions.php (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
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and the monitoring, reporting and verification arrangements for the upcoming 2015
treaty were finalized.49 In 2014, COP 20 was held in Lima, Peru, followed a year
later by the landmark COP 21 in Paris where an Agreement succeeding the Kyoto
Protocol was adopted.
COP 21 was a historic moment as 195 member states of the UNFCCC
signed onto the Paris Agreement, making it the first “universal. . . . global climate
deal.”50 While non-binding national commitments were necessary to meet the goals
of the Agreement, they are also considered one of the Agreement’s weaknesses
because they allow parties to individually set targets that fall far short of what is
required to prevent dangerous climate change.51 This weakness could change over
time if states consistently live up to the five-year reporting period called for by the
Paris Agreement and tighten their emissions targets each time to bring the goal of
one and a half degrees Celsius warming into reality; such consistency could, over
time, evolve into binding customary international law if accompanied by “a sense
of [binding] legal obligation.”52
COP 22 was held in Marrakech, Morocco, in 2016 in an atmosphere of
jubilation since the Paris Agreement had just entered into force only a few days
earlier on November 4, 2016.53 “By the close of the Marrakech conference, [the
Paris Agreement] had been ratified by 111 countries representing more than threefourths of global emissions.”54 By November 2017, all countries had signed onto
the Paris Agreement, including Nicaragua, which had initially abstained because it
views the Agreement as not going far enough to mitigate climate change.55
The reference to human rights in the Paris Agreement is a victory for
activists who spent many years advocating for climate projects to protect such
rights, but “much work remains to turn this commitment into protections on the
ground.”56 The Agreement notes that climate change is a common concern for

49. Warsaw Outcomes, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://
unfccc.int/key_steps/warsaw_outcomes/items/8006.php (last visited July 22, 2017).
50. Paris Agreement, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/
negotiations/paris_en (last visited July 22, 2017).
51. There are binding and non-binding aspects to the Agreement. 10 Things You Should Know
About the Paris Agreement, and What They Mean For You, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://www.natur
e.org/ourinitiatives/urgentissues/global-warming-climate-change/the-paris-agreement-what-does-it-mea
n.xml (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
52. DOUG TEDESCHI ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., A GUIDE TO THE BASICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2005, updated 2012), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academicprograms/legal-writing-scholarship/writing-center/upload/AGuidetotheBasicsofIntlLaw.pdf.
53. Patricia Espinosa & Salaheddine Mezouar, Opinion, Paris Enters into Force – Celebration and
Reality Check, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Nov. 4, 2016), http:
//newsroom.unfccc.int/paris-agreement/paris-agreement-enters-into-force-celebration-and-realitycheck/.
54. CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., OUTCOMES OF THE U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE
IN MARRAKECH 2 (2016), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2016/11/outcomes-of-the-u-nclimate-change-conference-in-marrakech.pdf.
55. Sarah Begley, Nicaragua Didn’t Sign the Paris Agreement Because It Didn’t Go Far Enough,
TIME (May 31, 2017), http://time.com/4799844/nicaragua-paris-climate-agreement-countries/.
56. Human Rights in the Paris Agreement, HUM. RTS. & CLIMATE CHANGE WORKING GROUP,
http://climaterights.org/our-work/unfccc/road-to-paris-cop21-protect-human-rights-in-climate-action/
(last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
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humanity and calls on member-states, “when taking action to address climate
change, [to] respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human
rights.”57 Common concern in international law indicates that human rights is still
soft law in the climate regime, which means that adherence to that standard is not
yet legally binding.58
III.

MARKET-BASED RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE

In operationalizing the goals of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol
allocated emissions rights to parties that accepted targets for limiting or reducing
emissions, listed in Annex B.59 This excluded developing countries as they were
not allocated emissions reductions targets under the Protocol. It created three
market-based mechanisms to incentivize states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions:
(1) emissions trading; (2) joint implementation of carbon-offsetting projects; and
(3) the clean development mechanism (CDM).60 These mechanisms are the
bedrock of the global carbon regime. The emissions patterns for developed
countries were “grandfathered in” from 1990 levels, an approach that indirectly
rewarded industries that had done the least to cut back emissions before the
Protocol entered into force.61
The right to emit greenhouse gases (RTE) is exercised through emissions
trading or cap and trade. Permits are allocated by states to certain industrial
producers, and trading is between emitters that have surplus credits and those that
need additional credits to offset their emissions elsewhere.62 Joint implementation
occurs where partnerships can be formed between developed countries and
economies-in-transition to carry out emissions-reduction or removal projects in the
transitioning economies. The clean development mechanism (CDM) is where
emissions-reduction projects are implemented in developing countries. CDM
projects generate Certified Emission Reduction units (CERs) or carbon credits that
the developed country or private party can sell in the carbon market. Under the
Protocol, each participating country was allocated a certain number of Assigned
Amount Units (AAUs)—the market’s “carbon currency”—based on its reduction
target.63 Countries were to keep their average emissions for the 2008-2012 period
within the number of AAUs that they have been allocated.64 If a state exhausted its

57. Paris Agreement, supra note 18, pmbl.
58. See generally Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J.LEGAL
ANALYSIS 171 (2010) (analyzing the nature of international soft law and reasons for states’ decisions to
use soft law over binding law in various circumstances).
59. Kyoto Mechanisms – Emissions Trading, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php (last
visited Feb 11, 2017).
60. Kyoto Mechanisms - Background, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/2998.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2017).
61. See Philippe Cullett, The Kyoto Protocol and Vulnerability: Human Rights and Equity
Dimensions, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 36, at 183, 202.
62. See Daniel C. Matisoff, Making Cap-And-Trade Work: Lessons from the European Experience,
52 ENVIRONMENT 10 (2010), for a good overview on how emissions cap-and-trade works.
63. NEWELL & PATERSON, supra note 17, at 99.
64. Id.
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AAUs but still needed more, it could purchase additional AAUs from another party
that may have a surplus because it was not emitting as much.65 The UN keeps a log
of the transactions “to prevent double counting.”66
Initially conceived as a mechanism for North to South transfers of wealth
and technology, permit allocations were proposed to be made under a per capita
basis.67 The implication was that this would enable more populated global South
countries to sell their “extra” permits to less populated industrial countries, thus
bringing a degree of equity into the system.68 Once the permit concept was
formally incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, “it became clear that
the equitable part of the equation was to be eliminated.”69 With the creation of the
SDM, the international community has an opportunity to reintroduce and
operationalize an equitable, per capita dimension to carbon trading on a global
scale.
“Each AAU is worth one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent or tCO2e.”70
The tCO2e is the unit of account in all carbon markets.71 It is used for comparable
measurement purposes by carbon market participants.72 The tCO2e can be
considered as a kind of “gold standard” device, which brings stability into the
carbon markets because it signals value among the different carbon currencies or
permits.73 Unlike the mainstream global economy, which abandoned its gold
standard in 1971, the incorporation of an underlying unit of value (the tCO2e) in the
carbon market could shield this market from inflation and destabilizing market
swings that have become commonplace in the global financial markets.74 In terms
of human rights, cap and trade could potentially be beneficial for developing
countries that could use its proceeds for adaptation, mitigation and sustainable
development programs.
As currently conceived, the right to emit (RTE) is not a human right.
Under the Paris Agreement, however, an opportunity exists to include human
dimensions to the right when operationalizing the Sustainable Development
Mechanism (SDM). Key characteristics of human rights are that they are universal,
inalienable and inherent in all human beings.75 This means that every human being
is entitled to all the rights all the time; the rights are interdependent and indivisible.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 26.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 99.
71. Id. at 86.
72. See id.
73. See infra p. 17–18 (discussing the gold standard in the currency markets).
74. Adherence to the gold standard in currency markets was at its heyday during the 1880-1914
classical gold standard period when there was “unprecedented economic growth and relatively free trade
in goods, labor and capital.” Michael D. Bordo, Gold Standard, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY: THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GoldStandard.html (last visited
July 22, 2017). If the tCO2e does act like a gold standard device, adherence to it could potentially have a
similar effect in the carbon markets.
75. United Nations Hum. Rts. Office of the High Comm’r, WHAT ARE HUM. RTS?,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
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These characteristics are clearly lacking in emissions rights, which can be bought,
sold and traded off between some parties to the exclusion of others. Emissions
rights have also not been universal; AAUs have only been allocated and traded
among Annex I parties since developing countries were not given emissions caps
under the Protocol, but were instead included as sites for implementing clean
development programs.76
Emissions trading is done largely through corporations who cannot be
reached by human rights law for redress, as the human rights regime places a duty
on state governments, not private entities, as the guarantor of citizens’ rights.77
Given that the primary subjects of human rights law are states and their inhabitants,
the central role that corporations play in the carbon market means that non-state
actors—who lie outside the reach of human rights law—can be at the center of
many of the human rights violations arising from CDM climate change programs.
Take, for example, the Bajo Aguán project in Honduras. Owned by a subsidiary of
the Grupo Dinant Company, the project aims to recover biogas from effluent
created by a palm oil mill located on, and supplied by company-owned plantations
located on, land at the center of a violent dispute that has caused the deaths of over
100 peasant farmers.78 Despite those deaths, and other reported human rights
violations by security guards of the owner of the company, the CDM Board
registered the project and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private
sector arm of the World Bank, proceeded and financed it.79 The CDM Board, while
noting that the violations that had occurred were deplorable, stated that its mandate
was for greenhouse gas emissions and that it was therefore powerless to stop
registration of the project on human rights grounds.80 In lending to the project, the
IFC also “failed to comply with its own ethical standards.”81
Some states have also failed in their duty to guarantee that human rights
infringements do not occur in CDM projects in its jurisdictions, with an example
being the World Bank-funded Olkaria geothermal power project in Kenya.82 For
this project, the indigenous Maasai population was involuntarily resettled from
their 4,200-acre settlement to a 1,700-acre location without prior assurance that
their new home would be of sufficient quality to hold their cattle, which is the

76. See DEAN BAKER & JAMES BARRETT, ECON. POLICY INST., EPI ISSUE BRIEF NO.131,
CLEANING UP THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 1 (1999), https://secure.epi.org/files/page/-/old/issuebriefs
/ib131.pdf (“Under the CDM, nations in the developed world would be subject to caps on greenhouse
gas emissions while developing nations would not. Developed nations would be allowed to exceed their
caps as long as they found ways to reduce emissions by an equal amount in developing nations.”).
77. See Government Obligations, HUM. RTS. ADVOC. & HIST. INT’L HUM. RTS. STANDARDS, http://
humanrightshistory.umich.edu/accountability/obligationr-of-governments/ (last visited July 22, 2017).
78. See Chris Lang, How the World Bank’s Safeguards Failed to Uphold Human Rights in
Honduras and Kenya, REDD-MONITOR (June 19, 2015), http://www.redd-monitor.org/2015/06/19/howthe-world-banks-safeguards-failed-to-uphold-human-rights-in-honduras-and-kenya/.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting and citing Martin Hession, CDM Board chair at the time).
81. Id. (quoting Nina Lakhani, World Bank’s Ethics Under Scrutiny After Honduras Loan
Investigation, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2014, 11:07 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2014/jan/13/world-bank-ethics-scrutiny-honduras-loan-investigation).
82. Wlfgang Obergassel et al., Human Rights and the Clean Development Mechanism: Lessons
Learned from Three Case Studies, 8 J. HUM. RTS.& ENV’T. 51, 66–68 (2017).
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primary source of Maasai livelihood, and would have adequate housing and
security of tenure through allocation of title deeds.83 The World Bank’s policy on
involuntary resettlement was not properly followed, resulting in conflict between
the Maasai and the project implementers. The human rights violations in cases such
as this one, whether by private bodies or state entities, prompted human rights
activists to press for the inclusion of human rights protection in the Paris
Agreement.
As compared with human rights, the right to emit greenhouse gases is a
fungible, new right, which cannot be claimed by human beings based on being
human; rather, it is an exclusive right available only to state and corporate actors, to
be used for trading and investment. Given the problems that have emerged in
realizing that right under the CDM, its operationalization under the SDM should be
done in ways that will promote rights-based sustainable development.
The creation of a right to promote economic ends that are not necessarily
linked to social justice considerations is not without precedent in international law.
The RTE can be compared with the global currency market’s special drawing rights
(SDR) that were created in 1969 under the Bretton Woods system.84 By the end of
the 1960s, the expansion of global trade had outstripped available world reserve
assets, threatening an economic deflation.85 The SDR was created as “a new global
reserve asset”86 to support growing international trade by entitling holders to
“obtain an equivalent amount of freely usable currency by agreement from another
[SDR] holder or by designation by the [International Monetary] Fund [IMF] from
another participant.”87 The unit value for the SDR was equivalent to the gram value
of gold (0.888671 grams) in the U.S. dollar—the global reserve currency—under
the gold standard (or par value) system.88 Before the United States unilaterally took
the international community off the gold standard in 1971, the par value system had
been successful in maintaining exchange rate stability between currencies, and the
creation of the SDR was designed as a reserve asset89 that would help maintain
stability in an expanding global market. The subsequent demise of the par value
system meant that states had to find another way to mitigate the risks that came
with freely floating exchange rates. The IMF did this by drawing on its emergency
powers and adopting a method of calculating the value of the SDR using a basket
of currencies, which were originally sixteen but today are only five: the Euro, the

83. Id.
84. See IMF, Special Drawing Right (SDR), Factsheet, at 1 (Oct. 2017), http://www.imf.org/About
/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/14/51/Special-Drawing-Right-SDR?pdf=1 [hereinafter SDR Factsheet]
(“The SDR was created by the IMF in 1969 as a supplementary international reserve asse[t] in the
context of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system.”).
85. Tobias M.C. Asser, Assistant Gen. Counsel at the IMF (retired), Lecture: Aspects of
International Finance – An Introduction for Lawyers at the Georgetown University Law School 93 (July
1997). (International Finance class lecture notes on file with author).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Special Drawing Rights, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/about/sdr.htm
(last visited July 22, 2017) (“The Special Drawing Right . . . is an international reserve asset, created by
the IMF in 1969 to supplement the existing official reserves of member countries.”).
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Japanese yen, the Chinese renminbi, the British pound sterling, and the U.S.
dollar.90
In the same way that the currency markets resorted to the creation of the
SDR as a mechanism to maintain economic stability in the wake of expanding
global trade, the RTE has been created as an attempt to stabilize concentrations of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in response to fossil-fueled industrialization.
SDRs are a way of mitigating the risks of freely floating currencies on economic
stability, while RTEs are a way of mitigating the risks of increasing greenhouse
gases on climate stability. The SDR system favors the economic liquidity of states
that originate its basket of currencies, which gives them an advantage over nonoriginating countries that are dependent on the former’s liquidity. Similarly, carbon
trading using RTEs under the Protocol favored developed (Annex 1) countries,
giving them an advantage over developing countries in the carbon economy. This
advantage makes it possible for industrial states to garner new economic resources
through carbon trading, and put those resources towards mitigating and adapting to
climate change. However, non-industrial states have had to content themselves with
finding adaptation responses to climate change through the aid regime, which is
controlled by industrial, donor states.
SDRs are allocated to states in proportion to their IMF quotas. This means
that highly capitalized, wealthy states like the United States, Japan, Britain and
China have larger SDR quotas,91 which logically, must make it easier for these
economies to engage in and expand their presence in world trade. By contrast, lowcapitalized developing states have small SDR shares that limit their ability to
expand their economies and engage more profitably in world trade.92 At present,
the United States has the largest SDR quota valued at approximately $118 billion
USD while Tuvalu has the smallest at about $3.5 million USD.93 In the climate
context, the US was a very high emitter of greenhouse gases at 16.5 metric tons per
capita as of 2014, while Tuvalu in 2014 was a negligible emitter at 1 metric ton per
capita.94 Thus, the RTE approximates the SDR, which reinforces the proposition
that the carbon market has been patterned after the unequal global currency
market.95
Similar to SDRs, RTEs under the Protocol have been allocated to states in
proportion to their 1990 emissions levels, thereby grandfathering emissions rights
for industrial states through which they could engage in carbon trading, while
developing countries had none as they were not given emissions caps under

90. SDR Factsheet, supra note 84, at 1.
91. See generally IMF, IMF Quotas, Factsheet (Oct. 2017), http://www.imf.org/About/Factsheets/S
heets/2016/07/14/12/21/IMF-Quotas?pdf=1.
92. See id. at 1 (“The current quota formula is a weighted average of GDP (weight of 50 percent),
openness (30 percent), economic variability (15 percent), and international reserves (5 percent).”).
93. Id.
94. CO2 Emissions (Metric Tons per Capita), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?page=4 (last visited Aug. 10, 2017).
95. Given the glaring inequality in the global economy, we can expect that the carbon market, so
long as it remains modelled after the currency markets, will also be a site for continued global
inequality.
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Kyoto.96 The absence of RTE allocations for developing countries under the CDM
is a reflection of two factors: (1) the country’s insignificant emission levels; and (2)
their lack of economic or technological resources to become significant greenhouse
gas emitters. The requirement under the Paris Agreement for all states, developed
and developing, to declare their intended nationally determined contributions
(NDCs) for reducing emissions brings developing countries under an emissions cap
largely because of the rising emissions of China and India97 and other unbound
large emitters like Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Israel98 since the entry
into force of the Kyoto Protocol, which suggests that these countries will get RTEs
under the SDM. Other large emitters not bound under the Protocol Developing
countries, are nonetheless coming under a cap without having had the benefit of
being investors in the carbon market at the time of the market’s creation. They also
remain dependent on industrial states to allocate them resources through the aid
regime for their transition into green economies. These realities underscore the
unequal global political economy within which the carbon economy is emerging.
Rather than subjecting all developing countries, including those that are
net carbon sinks, to the same requirements of adopting an emissions cap, a better
approach under the SDM could be the creation of a carbon investment right (CIR)
for both developed and developing countries that is based on both per capita (PC)
and a protection-of-natural-resource-endowments (PNRE) basis. This system
would work by allocating CIRs based on a country’s population; the greater a
country’s population and the more natural resources a country has, the more CIRs
they are allocated. A formula for allocating these investment rights is
PC+PNRE=CIR. The SDM and its emissions trading scheme, as well as other
voluntary trading schemes, could be configured under the Paris Agreement to
incorporate such a right.
In the global currency markets, the SDR “is a potential claim on the freely
useable currencies of IMF members”99 by states that need to shore up their
currency reserves. Freely useable currencies are the five basket currencies that were
chosen because they are widely used in international transactions.100 In a similar
vein, the RTE is a potential claim on the freely usable carbon resources of the Earth
by (industrial) states that want to maintain or increase their already high standards
of living. Freely useable fossil fuels (in the sense that if one can access them one is
free to use them) are currently the driving engine of industrial development, which
facilitates higher standards of living. Holders of SDRs can buy, with interest,
96. See BAKER & BARRETT, supra note 77, at 1 (noting the absence of emissions caps for
developing nations under the Kyoto Protocol).
97. See Ed King, Kyoto Protocol: 10 Years of the World’s First Climate Change Treaty, CLIMATE
HOME NEWS (Feb. 16, 2015, 2:37 PM), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/02/16/kyotoprotocol-10-years-of-the-worlds-first-climate-change-treaty/ (“[In 2015,] analysts say emissions could
rise 2.5%, 65% above 1990 levels, driven by growth in China and India.”). The USA did not ratify the
Protocol and was thus another large emitter that was left out of Kyoto’s caps.
98. Fred Pearce, The Climate Freeloaders: Emerging Nations Need to Act, YALE ENV’T 360 (Jan.
29, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/features/the_climate_freeloaders_emerging_nations_need_to_act.
99. SDR Factsheet, supra note 84, at 1; see also Lesley Wroughton, Q+A-What’s Next for the IMF
Special Drawing Right?, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/1
1/imf-sdrs-idUSN1119264120101111.
100. See SDR Factsheet, supra note 84, at 1–2.
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global currencies in exchange for their SDRs.101 RTE holders, whether these rights
are AAUs, EUAs or other carbon “currencies,” can buy greenhouse gas
atmospheric space among themselves in exchange for their RTEs.
SDR holders can redeem their rights in either through “voluntary
exchanges between members” or by the IMF “designating members with strong
external positions to purchase SDRs from members that have weak external
positions.”102 States with “strong external positions” in the SDR regime are
comparable to, and in many cases synonymous with, the states that have high
greenhouse gas emissions as evidenced in the earlier example of the United States
and Tuvalu.103 The voluntary exchange of SDRs in the currency market is akin to
emissions trading in the carbon market. The purchase of SDRs by states that have
“strong external positions” from those that have “weak external positions” can be
compared with emissions credit purchases by industrial states that implement clean
energy or carbon sequestration projects in non-industrial countries under the CDM
and joint implementation (JI) initiatives, and which will likely be extended to the
SDM. Industrial states have high external greenhouse gas emissions positions while
developing nations (with exceptions like China, Malaysia and India) have low
external emissions positions. This should work in favor of developing nations and
put them in a strong position for getting carbon investment rights for climate
change adaptation and mitigation. However, the Protocol created a rights regime
that strengthens the position of climate duty bearers and correspondingly weakens
the position of climate rights holders. This is an example of how economic rights
(in this case the RTE) often ignore issues of social justice. However, when those
concerns are raised, the response is that the market will even out discrepancies and
promote efficiency. There is an opportunity to rectify this inequitable approach by
creating a broader and more balanced RTE under the SDM.
The purchase of additional emissions space by developed countries from
developing ones through CDM and JI projects, even though providing developing
countries with some income they could potentially use for development, effectively
amounts to developing countries selling-off their right to development. This is
because these countries do not have the technological capacity to put that income
towards their own industrialization. By trading away their carbon space to other
countries, they are limiting their ability to industrialize using the cheapest form of
energy—carbon. The question remains as to whether clean energy sources will
become affordable enough for developing countries to industrialize at a pace and
on a timeline, that does not prolong the poverty found in many of these states.
Many of these countries face huge economic challenges realizing basic rights for
their citizens—food, clean water, education and basic sanitation to name a few.104

101. See id. at 2.
102. Id.
103. See IMF Quotas, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.imf.org/en/About/
Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/14/12/21/IMF-Quotas (noting that “the largest member of the IMF is the
United States, with a current quota (as of March 2017) of SDR82.99 billion (about US$118 billion), and
the smallest member is Tuvalu, with a quota of SDR2.5 million (about US$3.5 million)”).
104. See generally Roland Burke, Some Rights Are More Equal than Others: The Third World and
the Transformation of Economic and Social Rights, 3 HUMANITY 427 (2012) (discussing the history of
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Thus, money they earn perforce goes to such priorities rather than to industrializing
the economy. Meanwhile, global emissions levels will eventually have to be
capped, and while cost-effective alternatives to fossil-fuel based industrialization
are still under development, non-industrial states that are selling-off their emissions
space today will find their carbon-based development options limited in the
future.105
Adopting resource and per capita investment units under a CIR model can
be a step towards creating a more equal climate mitigation and adaptation field.
There could, for example, be a forest amount unit of account (FAU) for states that
have significant forest cover; animal biodiversity amount units (ABAU) for
countries that have large numbers of animal species (and these could be further
subdivided); flora biodiversity amount units (FBAU); water amount units (WAU)
for water bodies that are carbon sinks, soil quality units (SQU) for soils that
sequestrate carbon and so on. Investing in such units could be an incentive for
developing and developed countries to prioritize sustainable use and conservation
of their natural resources, resulting in both economic benefits and environmental
preservation that benefits both states and the whole planet in the wake of climate
change.
Just as SDRs are financial assets that bastion the position of wealthy states
in global economy, RTEs are “reserve atmospheric assets” that bastion carbonbased development for industrial states. It remains to be seen whether RTEs under
the SDM will change this, but the negatively skewed distribution of carbon
capitalism, designed as it is on trading lucrative emissions rights for industrial
states at the expense of non-industrial ones, does not augur well for social or
economic justice.
Fairly priced CIR instruments for developing states as an integral part of
the market, could produce a more normal distribution of carbon trading and bring
the market closer to a bell-shaped curve. In the meantime, a market that is patterned
on an unfair106 global currency market remains a cause for concern. The allocation
of some SDRs to developing countries has not resulted in a globally just currency
market, so it is likely that the allocation of RTEs to those countries under the SDM,
while somewhat improving the current skew of the carbon market, will give a
similarly unequal result.
The right to emit greenhouse gases, if not properly controlled and fairly
allocated, threatens, inter alia, human rights to life, livelihoods, shelter, property,
health and a clean environment. As currently conceived, the RTE primarily
facilitates the swapping of emissions locations rather than substantively reducing
emissions. The current configuration can also provide an incentive for increasing
emissions through the speculative capital accumulation opportunities that it

economic and social rights in the developing world and the impact of a governmental focus on
development and modernization on their evolution).
105. See Anil Agarwal, A Southern Perspective on Curbing Global Climate Change, in CLIMATE
CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY 375, 377 (Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., 2002).
106. See, e.g., Held in Reserve: A Brief Guide to the IMF’s “Currency,” ECONOMIST (Apr. 8, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/node/13447239#print.
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provides.107 The Protocol gave industrialized states greater rights to the global
atmospheric commons while failing to also give them an enforceable duty to
protect the human rights of the world’s citizens that are negatively impacted by
climate change. The Paris Agreement, in potentially extending RTEs to developing
countries through the SDM, also fails to articulate an enforceable duty to protect
human rights within the climate regime even though human rights are mentioned in
the Preamble.
Another impediment to the realization of human rights through a
predominantly market-based approach to climate change is the structure of the
carbon market itself. The market is focused on “easing cuts in rich countries” with
“little to say about the long-term development needs of poorer countries.”108 The
privatization of greenhouse gas emissions rights may well determine the eventual
global distribution of economic development capacity. This could negatively
impact the full realization of the right to development for developing countries.
Under current projections, stabilizing global temperatures will, in addition to the
reductions required from industrial countries, require that emissions from
developing countries peak by 2030,109 which is hardly enough time for them to
meet all their development goals.110
IV.

HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Human rights activists have argued that market-based approaches to
climate change have been primarily driven by the “inventiveness and greed of
financiers”111 and not by concerns to contain and possibly reverse climate change.
Climate capitalism, as it currently operates, “discriminate[s] against those who
cannot afford to pay”112 and widens the economic gap between climate duty bearers
and climate rights holders. This growing inequality, and the increasing
vulnerability that it engenders, is at the heart of the human rights call for climate
justice. Privatization of emissions access to the atmosphere, under today’s neoliberal model, is creating impediments to the realization of already recognized
human rights. This has prompted some scholars to call for recognition of the
atmosphere as a common heritage of humanity.113 With the latter approach, human
rights can “provide a compass for policy orientation” that promotes equity.114

107. See generally jonrainer, Emissions Trading Scheme: Corruption, Speculation & Fraud, ISSUES
18, 2013), https://p
hysicsandsocietybc.wordpress.com/2013/02/18/eu-emissions-trading-scheme-corruption-speculationfraud (discussing speculation problems in the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme).
108. Stephen Humphreys, Conceiving Justice: Articulating Common Causes in Distinct Regimes, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 35, at 299, 304.
109. Pamela Duncan, Critical Mass of States Will Reach Emissions Peak by 2030 under Climate
Deal, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2015, 1:01 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/datablog/2015/
dec/13/emissions-peak-by-2030-climate-deal-co2.
110. Cf. Humphreys, supra note 35, at 21.
111. NEWELL & PATERSON, supra note 17, at 107.
112. Humphreys, supra note 35, at 306.
113. See Cullet, supra note 61, at 199.
114. Humphreys, supra note 35, at 19.
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The speed with which new emissions rights have been created in
international climate change law115 contrasts with the slow pace of realization of
social, economic and cultural rights that have been on the international agenda for
decades prior to the climate problem coming into existence. Rights appear to be
hierarchical, with industrial nations’ economic rights trumping those of developing
countries. Developing countries are at a disadvantage because they were left out of
carbon trading under the Protocol. As such, developed countries have first-mover
positions in the global carbon market that will be implemented under the SDM. The
exclusion of developing countries as investors in an economy that, in 2015, was
valued at almost €48.4 billion,116 further tilted global economic power in favor of
industrial states and deprived developing countries of new resources being
generated from this market, which they could put towards realization of their right
to development and the human rights of their citizens.
Human rights, like the emissions rights created under the carbon market,
come into legal existence through state recognition and enforcement. As swiftly as
new rights to emit GHGs were created and effected under the Protocol, recognition
and protection of already existing human rights under international law could have
been made an integral part of the articles of the Paris Agreement (and of the Kyoto
Protocol before it), thus providing an actionable foundation for a climate regime
based on both social and economic justice; unfortunately, human rights are only
referenced in a non-binding manner in the Preamble. 117
Human rights were initially laid out in the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). 118 They are a specific set of claims about “the
entitlements of all human beings regardless of ‘race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.’”119 International human rights are enshrined in the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR).120 These treaties entered into force
in 1976 and are binding on states that have ratified them.121 The UDHR, the

115. Compared to those social, economic and cultural rights that are still in the “progressive
realization” stage, these rights were created in a very short time—during the seven-year Protocol
negotiation process. See History, KYOTO PROTOCOL, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/~dano
v20d/site/history.htm (last visited July 22, 2017) (“The Kyoto Protocol finally came into effect on
February 16, 2005, 7 years after it was first negotiated.”).
116. See CARBON MARKET MONITOR - AMERICA TO THE RESCUE: REVIEW OF GLOBAL MARKETS IN
2015 AND OUTLOOK FOR 2016-2018, at 1 (2016), https://climateobserver.org/wp-content/uploads/2016
/01/Carbon-Market-Review-2016.pdf.
117. Paris Agreement, supra note 19, pmbl. (emphasis added) (stating that the “[p]arties should,
when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations
on[, inter alia,] human rights”).
118. Humphreys, supra note 35, at 8 (citation omitted).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 8–9. See generally What Is the Difference Between Signing and Ratifying a Treaty?,
DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR MENSCHENRECHTE, http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/en/topics/de
velopment/frequently-asked-questions/3-what-does-signature-of-a-treaty-entail-and-what-is-thedifference-to-ratification/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
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ICCPR, and the ICESR form the International Bill of Human Rights.122 Human
rights carry legal authority notwithstanding change in government or state
succession.123 They have been said to constitute a “common language of humanity”
and, despite their inadequacy in some instances, human rights “are perhaps all that
we have to interrogate the barbarism of power.”124
Recourse to the platform of human rights is frequently seen “in situations
where hard legal obligations are unavailable or disputed.”125 Human rights “give
voice to human suffering,” “make it visible” and try “to ameliorate it.”126 Respect
towards other human beings as co-equals is “the groundwork of an ethic of human
rights, furnishing universally valid norms for human conduct and the basic
structure of a just society.”127 Human rights discourses “carry the burden of a
transformative vision of the world, [in which] the state . . . incrementally become[s]
ethical, governance just, and power (in all its hidden habitats) accountable.”128
“The UN Human Rights Council has affirmed that climate change ‘poses an
immediate and far-reaching threat’ [to] the ‘full enjoyment of human rights.’”129 A
human rights approach to climate change calls for “non-discrimination,
participation, transparency, and accountability”130 on the part of all parties to a
climate change project or program.
IPCC reports barely mention human rights, and where they do “it is
almost exclusively in connection with harms that have already taken place.”131 For
example, the 2005 Inuit petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, which was brought to the attention of the IPCC, describes how global
warming has destroyed sea ice which is “a critical resource” for the Inuit people.132
They “use it to travel to hunting and harvesting location[s] and for communication
between communities.”133 The petition goes on to state that loss of thickness of the
ice has made travel and hunting more dangerous for the Inuit, with more members
of the community “falling through the sea ice into the frigid water below” and has
also made everyday life for them more “difficult and dangerous.”134
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Some of the international human rights recognized in the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man violated in this case are the right to
life, the right to residence and movement, the right to inviolability of the home, the
right to the preservation of health and to well-being, the rights to benefits of culture
and the right to work and to fair remuneration.135 The Commission, while failing to
hold in favor of the Inuit, noted that had it done so, it would, however, not been in a
position to compel the United States government to comply with the decision, a
reality that highlights the need for a supra-national, globally-enforceable human
rights regime.
In the absence of such a regime, some activists have proposed that climate
change be classified as a crime against humanity.136 Another option could be to
elevate the right to development as a “meta-right” that would encompass not only
climate change, but also all polluting activities, and cover the preservation of the
Earth’s biodiversity and the global commons.137 Rights to self-determination and
sovereign control over natural resources that “protect” nation-states’ choices to
exploit fossil fuel development may have to be re-conceptualized because selfdetermination “cannot be construed as a right against the rest of [the world.]”138
Earth’s carbon sinks must be seen as global commons “in the trusteeship of the
state in which they are sited for the common benefit of humanity.”139
The Inuit case highlights some of the difficulties that arise when seeking
remedies for human rights violations arising from climate change. These include
problems in establishing extraterritorial responsibility for climate rights violations
as they often lie with “diffuse actors, both public and private.”140 Social and
economic rights also have notoriously weak enforcement under international
law,141 and because climate change will likely lead to a progressive deterioration of
these rights, rights holders will become less resilient.142 Progressive deterioration of
social and economic rights runs counter to the international standard that
recognizes states’ rights to progressively realize these rights for their citizens.143
Conflicts of rights between those harmed by climate change and economic
actors responsible for carbon pollution set the stage for an adversarial approach to
resolving climate change issues and presents a dichotomy between the formal “hard
law” of human rights and the “soft” nature of climate change law, which has
evolved through negotiation and compromise.144 This soft law, nevertheless,
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protects hard economic interests of industrial countries at the expense of “soft
human rights” for climate victims, which can be seen in the Inuit example. Human
rights are political norms dealing mainly with how people should be treated by
their governments and institutions.145 In the context of climate change, there are
also vulnerable states that are looking to the international regime (other states) to
treat them with justice in the global political economy, while specific communities
within nations would be looking to their own states to protect human rights because
human rights “primarily impose obligations on the government of the country in
which the person resides or is located.”146 The market-based approach, as we have
seen, however, is one that favors industrial states and institutions over nonindustrial states and communities, underpinning the skewed and hierarchical nature
of rights creation under international law and how that skew privileges more
powerful parties.
Since human rights are much “more concerned with avoiding the worst
than with achieving the best,”147 this leaves space for the economic agenda to
trump the rights agenda as climate change is not necessarily seen as a catastrophic
situation for much of the present generation. Infringements of climate rights of the
vulnerable and the poor are not viewed as “matters of ‘paramount importance’” and
a “‘grave affront to justice’”148 by the current status quo, which has chosen to cash
in on carbon through an offset approach rather than institute mechanisms that will
accelerate the decarbonization of the global economy.149
Without an enforcement mechanism at the international level to compel
states and corporations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and protect the climate
rights of the world’s citizens, the most that vulnerable states and communities can
do is invoke—but not realize—both their right to exist and their right to freedom
from significant environmental harm. Additionally, they attempt to demand
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by parties that are responsible for climate
change.150 Such invocation, however, leaves human rights in the aspirational realm,
leading duty bearers to argue that they are “not real rights”151 and can therefore be
ignored. Nonetheless, inclusion of human rights and the right to development in the
Paris Agreement, together with the creation of the SDM through which developing
countries can also trade in the carbon market, are signs of hope that the
international community can find the will to create an equitable climate regime that
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protects not only the environment but also promotes sustainable development for
all member states.
While it is not clear how the SDM will be operationalized, its name
suggests a move away from a purely market-based rationale for climate change
mitigation to one of environmental sustainability. Much will depend, however, on
the operational principles of this new mechanism. The Paris Agreement calls for
voluntary nationally determined contributions (NDCs) of greenhouse gas
reductions by all member parties.152 Through the SDM, developing countries can
also participate in global carbon trading153 since they, too, are called upon to set
emissions reductions goals.154 As shown in the Honduras and Kenya examples
cited in Section 3, operationalization of the climate regime’s mechanisms can result
in human rights violations, highlighting the need for states to ensure protection of
these rights.155 The Paris Agreement’s reference to human rights,156 despite its nonbinding nature, is an important step towards legal recognition by states of their
responsibility to protect those rights in climate change programs that are
implemented in their jurisdictions. The Paris Agreement is the first multilateral
environmental treaty to mention human rights.157 It can therefore be anticipated that
there will be greater scrutiny of human rights in the coming years of the climate
regime since the previous regime (the Protocol) made no mention of rights for
victims of climate change and climate projects.158 Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Paris
Agreement place a duty on industrial states to assist developing states with
economic, technological, and skills transfer that will increase developing states’
resilience to climate change. 159 Duty bearers also have an obligation to make
reparations for injuries suffered by victims of climate change and climate projects.
If, however, the SDM is operationalized from a neoliberal premise,
existing concerns will remain. These concerns include: (1) growing economic
inequality, wherein the rich get richer and the poor becoming more marginalized;
(2) a focus on making short-run money out of a looming environmental disaster,
which can obscure efforts to tackle the long-term problem of climate change and
economic reform; and (3) failure to effectively deal with the threat of climate
change in this generation, which would be irresponsible to future generations; and
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4) the perennial problem of international law, which is the lack of a supra-national
enforcement body that can ensure that states meet their climate commitments and
protect human rights.
The contest between human rights and economic interests also faces other
challenges. First, the human rights platform has limitations in the context of climate
change. Second, the realization of human rights requires responsiveness from the
state, which, when faced with a choice between promoting economic interests or
advancing human rights, tends to choose the former. Third, the realization of
human rights has historically been tied to the existence of an economic foundation
that can support those rights and many developing countries lack such a
foundation. Finally, for a climate justice platform to succeed, a broader basis for
state responsiveness beyond the narrow, limited focus on rights may be required,
one that more fully responds to the human dimension of the rights discourse. While
such a basis has not yet taken hold in law, scholars are beginning to push
jurisprudential boundaries by drawing on the concept of human vulnerability.160
If high emitters fail to commit to and meet sufficient emissions reduction
targets under the Paris Agreement, they will further aggravate global inequality by
effectively denying non-industrial nations the larger emissions caps that would be
available for their industrialization.161 This could potentially be mitigated by
broadening the RTE under the SDM.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Climate change is already disrupting human rights of less resilient
populations in both developed and developing countries. While the Paris
Agreement’s recognition of human rights is significant, protection and realization
of human rights within a free-market based approach to climate mitigation is a
challenge. This article examines drawbacks of market-based approaches to climate
change and argues for allocation of carbon investment rights (CIR) for developing
countries.
On the human rights front, climate change and climate projects are already
resulting in rights violations for the less resilient and powerful, as evidenced by the
Bajo Aguán project in Honduras and the Olkaria Geothermal project in Kenya.
However, a human rights platform, on its own, is limited in the extent to which it
can bring about climate justice. The diffuse nature of the public and private actors
responsible for climate change makes the enforcement of climate rights claims a
challenge. For developing countries that currently serve primarily as sources of
cheap emissions credits for industrial states, their goal of realizing their right to
development remains a distant aspiration in the current global status quo where
they are supporting increased wealth accumulation in the carbon market benefiting
the duty bearers of climate change.
Premised on human rights alone, the climate justice agenda may be
standing on too narrow a platform to turn the tide away from carbon-based
financial profiteering to sustainable development based on equity and social justice.
160. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY
L.J. 251 (2010).
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Climate justice advocates will need to draw on additional norms and standards,
such as accountability and social responsibility from both public and private actors
in their efforts to expand the platform from which an equitable global climate
regime can be operationalized.
Fairly priced carbon instruments that recognize the contribution that
developing countries are making to atmospheric balance and climate change
mitigation through their environmental protection efforts, such as forest account
units (FAU) and biodiversity account units (BAU) are some practical ways in
which equity can be brought to the distribution of economic assets being created in
the climate regime. Access to these assets will provide developing countries with
new resources that they can utilize for the protection and realization of the human
right to a stable and predictable climate that their citizens depend on.

